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UNION VIOLENCE AND BARGAINING ORDERS:
A NEW APPROACH TO LAURA MODES
Section 8 (a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act 1 declares
an employer's refusal to bargain collectively with the majority representative of his employees to be an unfair labor practice.2 The
customary remedy applied by the National Labor Relations Board
upon finding a section 8(a)(5) violation is the issuance of an order
requiring the employer to bargain collectively with the aggrieved
union.
Since the 1963 case of Herbert Bernstein (Laura Modes Co.),8
an employer guilty of refusing to bargain has been able, at least in
theory, to escape a bargaining order sanction by establishing that
the union has engaged in serious violent misconduct. 4 If successful, the Laura Modes defense 5 relieves the employer of its duty
to bargain until the union demonstrates majority support in an
election supervised by the Board.
As a remedy for union violence, the Laura Modes doctrine has
not fulfilled its promise. The Board has so restricted the range of
factual situations that will make out a successful Laura Modes defense that bargaining orders have been withheld in only three 6 of
many cases in which the question has been directly confronted, and
the Board regularly issues orders in favor of unions responsible for
astounding patterns of misconduct.7 Despite the Board's cramped
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
129
2
Section 8(a)(5) reads: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." Id.
3 144 N.L.R.B. 1592 (1963).
4D. McDoWELL & K. HUHN, NLRB REImmEs FOR UNFAm LABOR PRACTicES
194-98 (1976).
5 The use of the term "Laura Modes defense" requires some explanation.
Strictly speaking, Laura Modes does not establish a defense to a § 8(a) (5) charge.
In the Laura Modes situation, the employer is found guilty of an unfair labor practice
in refusing to bargain, and other sanctions, such as reinstatement of unfair labor
practice strikers with back pay, may result from that violation. The Issue of union
violence is relevant only to the question of the appropriateness of the bargaining
order as a remedy. It is as a defense to the issuance of a bargaining order that the
term "Laura Modes defense" is used in this Comment.
6 Allou Distribs., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 47 (1973); Joseph H. Bliss (Artcraft Mantel
& Fireplace Co.), 174 N.L.R.B. 737 (1969); Herbert Bernstein (Laura Modes Co.),
144 N.L.R.B. 1592 (1963).
7Member Murphy's dissent in Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, Div. of Grede
Foundries, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (Mar. 24, 1978), [19781 NLRB Dec. 31,776,
provides a graphic summary of union misconduct that the panel majority did not find
sufficient to bar issuance of a bargaining order under Laura Modes:
Thus, for example, at the inception of the strike three union business
agents blocked the path of employees attempting to enter the plant, push(1640)
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reading of Laura Modes, employers have raised the issue with increasing frequency in recent years.8
In a recent case in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit enforced the Board's bargaining order, 9 Judge Hufstedler, in
dissent, criticized the Board for ignoring the coercive effects of union
violence on the representational rights of employees. 10 Her opining and jostling them. Others blocked the path of Personnel Manager
Stokes as one among them, Business Agent Poe, shouted obscenities at him
and threatened to "cut him up." Subsequently, Stokes was surrounded by
a number of union representatives, including International Union President
Elmer Lewis, and International Union Vice President Henry Harrison. On
that occasion, Poe grabbed Stokes' neck with his hands from behind and
someone grabbed Stokes' arms and held him. The group shouted obscenities at him, threatened him, and jostled him from side to side. Later that
day, Poe-in the company of two other business agents-threatened "to
cut" Stokes' groin after another had said that they "knew where Stokes
lived and were going to get him." On the following day, another business
agent struck Stokes in the back as police, who had meanwhile been called
to the scene, attempted to force miscreants back to the street. Other business agents directed their activities toward "recalcitrant" employees. One
business agent, Petetti, told employee Goldmeter to "get the hell out of here
or I will rip your nose out of your face." The employee withdrew. Another business agent pushed a female employee, who was attempting to
enter her car, so hard that her face struck the headrest and split her lip.
Others dropped roofing nails onto the roadway while employees looked on.
Still others broke the windows of automobiles attempting to enter the plant,
while International Vice President Harrison, himself, threatened employees
with damage to their cars if they did not stay at home. Harrison was
present when another business agent pretended to place an explosive device
on a car entering the plant. Business Agent Petetti opened the doors of a
stopped vehicle and forcibly removed two of the employee passengers. He
threw a brick which hit another vehicle being driven by a female employee.
Another business agent sprayed an irritating substance into the car of one
employee, causing the driver's nose to bleed and burning sensations in the
throats and eyes of the passnegers. Likewise, business agents disabled and
damaged the cars of others attempting to enter the plant; indeed, they
reached inside and pummelled those employees who did not appear to be
otherwise intimidated. Others, in their own automobiles, pursued cars
operated by nonstriking employees who were leaving the plant, occasionally
bumping them, shooting at them with slingshots, attempting to force them
into the path of oncoming traffic, or otherwise seeking to cause accidents.
Id., slip op. at 16-17, [1978] NLRB Dec. at 31,780-81.
8
See, e.g., L'eggs Prods., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (May 25, 1978), [19781
NLRB Dec. 32,270; Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, Div. of Grede Foundries, Inc.,
235 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (Mar. 24, 1978), [1978] NLRB Dec. 31,776; Bruce Duncan
Co., 233 N.L.R.B. No. 176 (Dec. 15, 1977), [1978] NLBB Dec. 31,286; Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 264 (1977), enforced in part,
582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978); John Dory Boat Works, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 844
(1977); Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1670 (1977), enforced, 578
F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978); Jimmy Dean Meat Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1977).
0NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1978).
lo Id. 478-80 (Hufstedler, J., concurring in part and dissenting In part).
The core section of the National Labor Relations Act guaranteeing employee
rights is § 7, which reads, In relevant part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
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ion, marking out the lines for a new approach to the Laura Modes
defense, laid the groundwork for the expanded scope of Laura
Modes proposed in this Comment.
Part I briefly explores the general background of the Board's
policies with respect to the bargaining order remedy. A closer look
at Laura Modes and other cases in which the Board has withheld
bargaining orders occupies part II. In part III, this Comment
analyzes the features on which the Board relies in rejecting Laura
Modes defenses. Part IV describes how the Board's handling of
Laura Modes contentions have fared in the courts of appeals, and
part V, building from Judge Hufstedler's analysis, constructs a new
approach to withholding bargaining orders because of union misconduct.
I. THE BARGAINING ORDER REMEDY
The Laura Modes cases, if they are to be fully understood,
must be placed in the perspective of the Board's general policies
concerning the issuance of bargaining orders. Roughly speaking,
a bargaining order may be an appropriate remedy in two contexts: first, when an employer violates its duty to bargain with a
union seeking initial recognition, and second, when an employer
violates its duty to bargain with an incumbent union.
In the initial recognition context, the Board's policies are largely
guided by two major Supreme Court decisions, NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co.11 and Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v.
NLRB.12 Gissel gave the Court's approval to the Board's trend in
the mid-1960's away from its long-standing doctrine, 38 under which
an employer could not lawfully refuse to recognize and bargain with
a card majority union unless it had a good faith doubt of the union's
majority in an appropriate unit. Under this approach, the employer's independent violations of the Act had been treated as evidence of bad faith. Addressing the situation in which the employer's
refusal to bargain is accompanied by independent unfair labor
practices, the Court in Gissel eschewed the subjective good faith
approach and measured the significance of the employer's additional
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
11395 U.S. 575 (1969).

12419 U.S. 301 (1974).
23 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). See generally R. GoPmAN, LABoa
LAw 93-96 (1976).
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unfair labor practices by the extent to which they undermined the
union's support and rendered a free and valid representation election unlikely. Although the Gissel Court expressed a preference
for Board-conducted elections and found authorization cards generally a less reliable indicator of employee desires, the Court nevertheless thought a card majority a sufficiently reliable basis for the
issuance of a bargaining order when the employer's violations are
so serious as to poison the election process.' 4 After Gissel, the
severity of the employer's violations and their coercive impact on
the employees are the determinative factors in deciding whether a
bargaining order should issue. 15
Linden Lumber resolved the question whether, in the absence
of any independent employer unfair labor practices, an employer can
be ordered to bargain with a union that demonstrates a valid card
majority. Reiterating its preference for expeditious representation
elections and its distaste for inquiries into the employer's state of
mind in protracted unfair labor practice proceedings, the Court affirmed the Board's position of putting the burden on the union to
petition for an election following the employer's refusal to accept a
card showing. 6
In the incumbent union context, the Board has adhered to a
presumption of the union's continuing majority status, rebuttable
only by the employer's good faith doubt supported by objective
evidence. Consistency with the Supreme Court's opinions in Gissel
and Linden Lumber, however, would require the Board to abandon
the subjective good faith analysis and to disdain use of unfair labor
14NLRB v. Cissel Pacing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969).
1' Id. 613-15. The Court appeared to approve the issuance of a bargaining
order as a remedy for "outrageous" and "pervasive" employer unfair labor practices,
even if the union has never been able to demonstrate a majority. The Board, however, has been reluctant to follow through on the Court's suggestion. See R.
Go.RiA, supra note 13, at 97. A recent case indicates that the Board may soon
reverse its long-standing policy. In United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B.
No. 179 (June 12, 1979), two members of the Board found that its remedial powers
"may well encompass" the authority to issue a bargaining order despite lack of a
majority showing, two others held that the Board has that authority, and a fifth
member found no such authority. No bargaining order was issued in the case.
16 Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 306-07, 310
(1974).
The Court reserved the question whether an employer violates § 8(a) (5) if it
breaches an agreement to have the union's majority status determined by some
method other than a Board election. Id. 310 n.10. After Linden Lumber, however,
one must question the validity of cases holding that an employer must bargain with

the union if it determines for itself that the union enjoys a card majority, e.g., by an
informal poll of its employees. See, e.g., Sullivan Elec. Co. v. NLBB, 479 F.2d
1270 (6th Cir. 1973). See note 30 infra. Even if the employer discovers that the
cards were indeed signed, issues of the appropriateness of the unit and the manner
of card solicitation still remain.
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practice proceedings in these withdrawal of recognition cases as it
has already done in the initial recognition context.'7
According to the theory of the bargaining order remedy expressed in Gissel and Linden Lumber, the Board should issue a
bargaining order only when employer unfair labor practices have
exerted a coercive effect on the employees so that their desires cannot be accurately determined in a free election. The purpose of
the bargaining order is to protect the employees' right to choose
their bargaining representative freely.' 8 It follows that a bargaining
order should issue only in favor of a union with an unclouded claim
to majority support. 19
What are the implications of this theory for the Laura Modes
situation, when the union has been found guilty of serious acts of
violent misconduct? When a union authorizes violence to achieve
its goals, it coerces the employees as much as, if not more than, the
employer does when it commits unfair labor practices such as discriminatorily discharging or interrogating employees, or threatening
or promising economic loss or gain. Even when the union's violence is directed exclusively at the employer and occurs out of the
presence of any employees, it must be considered as violative of the
employees' representational rights if they are likely to learn of it,
because the employees will not be slow to realize that the same techniques of "persuasion" can be turned on them should they differ
20
with the union.
In the Gissel situation, only the employer has coerced the employees, and the inability to hold a valid election can be remedied
by ordering the employer to bargain with the union that has previously supported its claim to majority status by a card showing. But
in the Laura Modes scenario, the union has impliedly dissipated its
own majority. The only way to do justice to the employees' right
to choose their representative in an atmosphere free of coercion is
17 See Daisy's Originals, Inc. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1972).
NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327 (3d Cir. 1970).

But see

' 8 The Gissel bargaining order also serves* a secondary purpose of deterring

employer violations. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 (1969).
Such deterrence, however, is designed to protect employee rights in the long run,
and the employees' long-range interest in deterrence should not be allowed to override their immediate interest in having their desires determined in a representation
election where one is possible. See id. 615.
39 It is assumed here that the employer's violations are not so outrageous as to

justify

a bargaining order even without evidence of the union's preexisting majority
support. See note 15 supra.

20 NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st CMr. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
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to withhold a bargaining order while the air dears and to conduct
a valid representation election as soon as possible.
This analysis has not been followed by the Board in Laura
Modes and subsequent cases, which more or less ignore the coercive
effects of union violence on the employees' free choice 21 and establish instead an unjustifiably stringent standard that few employers
have been able to meet. As a result, unions guilty of serious and
flagrant acts of violence and intimidation have wrongly enjoyed the
benefit of the bargaining order remedy.
II.

BARGAINING ORDERS WITHHELD

To understand how the Board perceives the Laura Modes defense, it is necessary to return to its origin in the Laura Modes
case itself. 22 All five of the employees in the bargaining unit au-

thorized the union to represent them, and the employer learned this
fact through direct interrogation. When the union made a bargaining request, the employer responded by asking for a day or two
to consult with its attorney. After the union agreed to this delay,
the employer met with the five employees, asked them to withdraw
from the union, and stated its intention never to contact the union
agent.
Immediately following the meeting one of the employees called
the union, which sent a business agent and eight union members to
the plant "to bolster their morale." 23 The group entered the plant
and tried to talk to the employees. When one of the partners of
the company attempted to call an attorney on the phone, one of
the union men seized the phone and struck him in the face. A
female office employee who then endeavored to call the police was
also "pushed around." 24 The mauling of the partner continued
until communication with the police was established, at which point
the union people abruptly left the plant of their own volition.
The employer spoke to the employees again later in the day
and threatened reprisals unless the men dropped the union, but
they all declined to do so. When the employer continued to refuse
21

Administrative Law Judge Maloney, in a generally insightful opinion, ob-

served: "Looked at analytically, the Board cases which deny bargaining orders because of union misconduct actually do not seem to address the problem of what
effect the misconduct of all parties has bad on the mind of the reasonable and
prudent voter."

Donelson Packing Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1060 (1975), enforced

mem., 569 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1978).
22 Herbert Bernstein (Laura Modes Co.), 144 N.L.R.B. 1592 (1963).
23 Id. 1593.
24 Id.
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to meet with union representatives for several days, the union filed
charges with the Board and the employees voted to strike. Seven
days after the strike commenced, a second partner was beaten by
four unidentified men after being followed and pointed out by one
of the striking employees, named Lewis. After this second incident,
the employer filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union,
claiming it had violated section 8(b)(1)(a) 25 of the Act by engaging
in violent misconduct. Two months later, however, a settlement
agreement was reached on the charge and the union thereafter refrained from any additional acts of violence.
The Board held that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) 26
of the Act by coercing employees in their choice of bargaining representative and also section 8(a)(5) by refusing to recognize the union
with the aim of undermining the union's majority status. The
company was ordered to reinstate the striking employees with the
exception of employee Lewis. Contrary to its normal practice in
such cases, however, the Board declined to order the company to
recognize and bargain with the union:
We do not, however, deem it appropriate to give the
Charging Union the benefit of our normal affirmative bargaining order in the circumstances of this case. For we
cannot, in good conscience, disregard the fact that, immediately before and immediately after it filed the instant
charges, the Union evidenced a total disinterest in enforcing its representation rights through the peaceful legal
process provided by the Act in that it resorted to and/or
encouraged the use of violent tactics to compel their grant.
Our powers to effectuate the statutory policy need not, we
think, be exercised so single-mindedly in aiming for remedial restoration of the status quo ante, that we must
disregard or sanction thereby union enforcement of an employer's mandatory bargaining duty by unprovoked and
irresponsible physical assaults of the nature involved here.
We recognize of course that the employees' right to choose
the Union as their representative survives the Union's misconduct. But we believe it will not prejudice the employees unduly to ask that they demonstrate their desires
2529 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
Section 8(b)(1)(A) reads in pertinent
part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . .
to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Id. The significant text of § 7 appears in note 10 supra.
section 7 ......
Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor
2629 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) (1976).
practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the
exercise of their § 7 rights. Id.
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anew in an atmosphere free of any possible trace of coercion. .

.

.

We conclude that, in the particular circum-

stances of this case, the policies of the Act and the legitimate
interests of the public and the parties will best be served
by denying to the Union the right to invoke our statutory
processes in aid of a demand for recognition as bargaining
representative of Respondents' employees unless and until
it demonstrates its majority among those employees through
27
the Board's election procedures.
The Board's holding in Laura Modes lends itself to a variety
of interpretations, both as to its scope and rationale. Read expansively, it might be taken to mean that whenever a union engages in violent or coercive conduct, the remedy of a bargaining
order is foreclosed. Construed narrowly, Laura Modes applies only
to a situation in which a card majority union seeks by "unprovoked," "physical assaults" to coerce recognition by the employer.
A second problem of interpretation derives from the opinion's
twin rationales. On the one hand, withholding the bargaining
order is a matter of "conscience," a variant, it seems, of the ancient
"unclean hands" doctrine of equity: by attempting to enforce its
statutory rights through extra-statutory and violent methods, the
union rendered itself unworthy of the Board's equitable intervention. On the other hand, the opinion suggests a representational
rationale: a bargaining order was inappropriate because only the
Board's certification election procedures could dispel "any possible
trace of coercion" contributing to the union's card majority status.
Relying almost exclusively in subsequent cases on the equity branch,
the Board has not paid sufficient attention to the effects of union
violence on the statutory rights of intimidated employees.
Unquestionably, the Board has given a narrow scope to Laura
Modes, sustaining the defense in only two cases since 1963: Joseph
H. Bliss (Artcraft Mantel & Fireplace Co.) 28 and Allou Distributors, Inc.2 9
Artcraft Mantel, like Laura Modes, involved a card majority
union striking for recognition. The employer's only violation of
the Act was his refusal to recognize and bargain with the union,
despite the lack of a good faith doubt as to the union's majority
status.30 Although no one was physically beaten, the trial exN.L.R.B. at 1596.
28 174 N.L.R.B. 737 (1969).
29201 N.L.R.B. 47 (1973).
30
The employer in Artcraft Mantel was held not to have a good faith doubt of
27144

the union's representative status because he knew that a majority of his employees
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aminer, 31 whose findings and conclusions were upheld by the Board
without modification, found abundant evidence of union involvement in an extended campaign of intimidation and property damage. Denying a bargaining order, the trial examiner emphasized the
union's "failure to compel or seek recognition by following through
on the normal procedures of Board action available ... under the
law." 32
In Allou Distributors,Inc.3 3 the Board reversed the administrative law judge's decision to issue a bargaining order. The employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) by initiating a
decertification petition, by promising improved benefits if the employees would sign, and by subsequently refusing to bargain with
the union upon termination of the existing contract. For its part,
the union, when it learned of the move to decertify, sent six business agents to the plant to "persuade" the employees by means of
force, threats, and intimidating conduct to withdraw the petition.
Although the judge found the agents' behavior to be "an aggravated
demonstration to the employees that they were in danger of suffering not only economic injury but also physical harm should they
persist in their efforts to withdraw from the Union," 34he thought
Laura Modes distinguishable because here the union, far from
seeking initial recognition, had been the recognized, if uncertified,
bargaining representative of the employees for a number of years. 35
Disagreeing with the judge's analysis, the Board panel described the union's behavior as "a deliberate plan of intimidation
and violence in order to insure the employees' adherence to the
Union," and found "this callous attempt to enforce its representation rights" to preclude a bargaining order remedy.36
If there is a common thread running through Laura Modes,
Artcraft Mantel, and Allou, it is that in each case the union engaged in a deliberate plan of violent misconduct with the aim of
securing or maintaining representational status in defiance of the
Board's established procedures. Although in every case the emwere on strike. After Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 419 U.S. 301 (1974),
in which the Supreme Court rejected the notion of a duty to bargain arising from
evidence of a majority strike, the finding of a § 8(a) (5) violation on the facts of
Artcraft Mantel is no longer good law.
31 The title of "trial examiner" was changed in 1972 to "administrative law
judge."

See 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a (1978).

32 174 N.L.R.B. at 741.
33201 N.L.R.B. 47 (1973).

3 Id. 47.
35 Id.

36 Id. 48.
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ployer violated its duty to bargain, in none of these three cases was
that duty the result of certification following a Board-supervised
election. According to this account of the Board's approach, union
violence standing alone will not suffice to preclude a bargaining
order; union violence deliberately employed to circumvent the
Board's own procedures for enforcing representational rights is required. Examination of the numerous cases in which the Board
has rejected the Laura Modes defense lends support to this inter37
pretation.
III.

BALANCING THE EQuITEs:

THE

BoARD's CONTAINMENT

Laura Modes
In the great majority of cases decided by the Board, employers
raising the Laura Modes defense meet with frustration. Occasionally, the employers' claims rest on union "misconduct" too minimal
for the Board to take seriously.38 More often, however, the Laura
Modes defense fails despite union violence of significant, if not
39
shocking, proportions.
For deciding whether to issue or withhold a bargaining order
in these cases, the Board has developed a balancing test that weighs
the seriousness of the union's misconduct against the gravity of the
employer's unfair labor practices. 40 Factors that weigh in the scales
include:
OF

37

These three cases also shed light on the Board's opinion in Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. 399 (1973).
In that
case the issue was whether the union should be held liable for back-pay damages to

employees prevented from working by the union's misconduct. Reaffirming its longstanding policy of not granting monetary damages to employees coerced by union
misconduct, the Board pointed to its practice of withholding bargaining orders as
one of several existing remedies that it deemed adequate to the task of preventing
union violence. Id. 399-400. Even assuming that withholding three bargaining
orders in the space of many years can be conceived of as having any effect at all
on union misconduct, the Board's remark appears especially obtuse when one considers that in none of those three cases was there any issue of backpay or lost
work38time.
Bruce Duncan Co., 233 N.L.R.B. No. 176 (Dec. 15, 1977), [1978] NLRB
Dec. 31,286 (circumstantial linking of one or two flat tires to one union picketer is
insubstantial against a request for a bargaining order); Paramount Gen. Hosp., Inc.,
223 N.L.R.B. 1017 (1976) (distribution of allegedly defamatory handbills too minimal to obviate need for bargaining order), enforced mem., 554 F.2d 1202 (D.C.
Cir. 1977). See note 51 infra.
3
9 See, e.g., Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, Div. of Grede Foundries, Inc.,
235 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (Mar. 24, 1978), [1978] NLRB Dec. 31,776; Ramonas Mexican
Food Prods., Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 663 (1973), enforced, 531 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.
1975); Quintree Distribs., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 390 (1972); United Mineral & Chem.
Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 1390 (1965), enforcement denied in relevant part, 391 F.2d
829 (2d
Cir. 1968).
40
See NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1978);
Donovan v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 1316 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053
(1976).
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I) the scope and intent of the union misconduct,
2) whether the misconduct occurs on or away from the picket
line, and
41
3) the existence of a section 8(b)(1)(A) settlement.
If, unlike the situation in Laura Modes, the union recently has
been certified pursuant to a valid Board election, the balance from
42
the outset tips in the union's favor.
In any given case, several of these considerations are likely to
be present and to influence the outcome, and isolation of a single
factor for the purpose of analysis does violence to the integrity of
the opinion. With this caveat, the following examination of each
of the above factors can still offer valuable insights into the general
trends of the Board's handling of the Laura Modes defense.43
A. Scope and Intent of Union Misconduct
In weighing the evidence of union violence the Board has returned repeatedly to language first enunciated in Laura Modes,
41

When balancing the employer's offenses against the union's misconduct, the
Board has occasionally remarked that it was the employer's unfair labor practices
which provoked the union in the first place. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, Div.
of Grede Foundries, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (Mar. 24, 1978), [1978] NLRB Dec.
31,776; General Iron Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 1180, 1194 (1976); Queen Mary
Restaurants Corp., 219 N.L.R.B. 776, 798 (1975), enforced, 560 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.
1977); Ramona's Mexican Food Prods., Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 663, 685 (1973), enforced, 531 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1975); Cascade Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 533, 536
(1971), enforcement denied on other grounds per curiam, 466 F.2d 748 (6th Cir.
1972). See Dow Chem. Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 82, 87 (1975). Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Thayer
Co., 213 F.2d 748, 770 (1st Cir.) (reinstatement of strikers guilty of misconduct),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954). Employer provocation might thus be considered
as a fourth factor in the Board's analysis of Laura Modes contentions. With a few
exceptions, however, see, e.g., Grede Plastics, supra, "provocation" as used by the
Board in these cases means no more than that the employer's violations are the "but
for" cause of the union's misconduct. In any case in which the Laura Modes defense is
properly raised the union's misconduct follows upon the employer's refusal to bargain.
Characterizing the employer's offense as a "provocation," therefore, does not further
the task of balancing, but merely defines the Laura Modes situation in terminology
unnecessarily laden with emotion. For criticism of a similar "provocation" analysis
in the context of reinstatement cases, see Stewart & Townsend, Strike Violence: The
Need for Federal Injunctions, 114 U. PA. L. Ruv. 459, 475 (1966).
42
Although no certified union has yet been the victim of a successful Laura
Modes defense, in reported cases decided by the Board, the Board has never articulated certification as an absolute bar to the Laura Modes defense. See note 65 infra
and text accompanying notes 60-64 infra.
4 Problems of proof constitute another hurdle for employers raising a Laura
Modes defense. Union misconduct must consist of acts of the union or its agents, or
acts for which the union can be held responsible. See R. GoRmAN, supra note 13,
at 218-19. In a case in which no evidence identifies the perpetrators of misdeeds,
or in which striking employees are identified, but no evidence links their acts to the
union or its agents, the Laura Modes defense will fail. John Dory Boat Works, Inc.,
229 N.L.R.B. 844, 854 n.28 (1977); C.A. Froedge Delivery & Trucking Servs., Inc.,
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which characterized the issue as whether the union's conduct demonstrates "a total disinterest in enforcing its representation rights
through the peaceful legal process provided by the Act." 44 As it was
in Laura Modes, such a determination is necessarily inferential,
because unions are understandably reluctant to admit a total disinterest in the Board's processes.
What constitutes the requisite "total distinterest"? The two
criteria most commonly relied on are the pervasiveness and the
45
deliberate or planned nature of the union's violent misconduct.
With standards as nebulous as these, no sure rules of thumb have
emerged. Thus, the employer's invocation of Laura Modes was
rejected in Pacific Abrasive Supply Corp.4 6 because the union misconduct consisted of only one incident. Yet in Allou Distributors,
Inc.,47 a single incident sufficed to forfeit the union's bargaining

order, perhaps because, although not pervasive, the conduct in question presented irrefutable evidence of a deliberate plan to terrorize
employees into withdrawing their support from a decertification
48
petition.
At the other extreme, five instances of serious misconduct,
which included several beatings and resulted in the extended hospitalization of one elderly victim, were found by the Board not to
be part of a plan of intimidation, despite a contrary holding by the
trial examiner.4 9 In that case, the Board relied on evidence that the
union zealously sought to enforce its statutory rights through the
Board's procedures to rebut the inference of "total disinterest" contained in the trial examiner's opinion.50
The Board's criteria of pervasiveness and deliberate or planned
violence, although they give some content to the test of whether
172 N.L.R.B. 46, 56 & n.41 (1968); Call, Burnup, & Sims, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1661

(1966), enforced, 393 F.2d 412 (1st Cir. 1968). See Donelson Packing Co., 220
N.L.R.B. 1043 (1975), enforced mem., 569 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1978).
44
Laura Modes Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1592, 1596 (1963). See, e.g., Great Chinese
Am. Sewing Co., 227 N.L.RLB. 1670, 1671 n.6 (1977), enforced, 578 F.2d 251 (9th
Cir. 1978); Pacific Abrasive Supply Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 329, 331 (1970).
45 Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 264, 288 (1977),
enforced in part,582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978); Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co., 227
N.L.R.B. 1670, 1671 n.6 (1977), enforced, 578 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978); Pacific
Abrasive Supply Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 329, 331 (1970); United Mineral & Chem. Corp.,
155 N.L.R.B. 1390, 1396 (1965), enforcement denied in relevant part, 391 F.2d 829
(2d Cir. 1968).
46 182 N.L.R.B. 329, 340 (1970).
47201 N.L.R.B. 47 (1973).

48See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.

49 United Mineral &Chem. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 1390, 1396 (1965), enforcement
denied in relevant part, 391 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1968).
5Old.
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the union has demonstrated a total disinterest in the Board's peaceful, legal processes, do not provide a predictable measure of the
scope or intent of union violence necessary to raise successfully the
Laura Modes defense.51 Even when union misconduct is pervasive,
it appears that a union can save itself by simultaneously pursuing
its rights through the Board's procedures.
B. Picket Line Distinction
When union misconduct occurs on the picket line, the Board
tends to discount it.52 Although this policy purports to be founded

in the statutory purpose, 53 it is difficult to believe that Congress
could ever bring itself to condone the results yielded by the policy
as applied by the Board in the Laura Modes cases.
In Quintree Distributors,Inc.,54 for example, the union was
found guilty of interfering with the movement of the employer's
51
A creative approach to the Laura Modes defense was taken, albeit unsuccessfully, by an employer in the recent case of L'eggs Prods., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B.
No. 43 (May 25, 1978), [1978] NLRB Dec. 32,270. Although no evidence of any
violence was involved, a union agent interfered with the job performance of an
employee whose testimony at an unfair labor practice proceeding had aroused the
agents ire. Noting the General Counsel's objection that the Laura Modes defense
applies only to violent union misconduct, the administrative law judge nevertheless
saw an analogy in that the agent's retaliatory conduct tended to subvert the Board's
procedures. The employer's ingenious attempt came to nought however, because
the judge found the incident to be a lone instance and not part of a plan of intimidation. Significantly, the judge did not hold Laura Modes inapplicable to nonviolent union conduct. Id., slip op. at 136-38.
52 Quintree Distribs., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 390 (1972); Dow Chem. Co., 216
N.L.R.B. 82, 82 n.1 (1975); United Mineral & Chem. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 1390
(1965), enforcement denied in relevant part, 391 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1968). See
Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, Div. of Grede Foundries, Inc., 235 N.R.L.B. No.
40 (Mar. 24, 1978), [19781 NLRB Dec. 31,776 (Murphy, Member, dissenting in
part).
53From the earliest days of collective bargaining under the Act, a certain
amount of picket line violence has been viewed as inevitable:
We think it must be conceded, however, that some disorder is unfortunately
quite usual in an extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially
a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings
whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot
words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation
from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this
nature, however much it is to be regulated, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of the Act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 163, that nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were
not so the rights afforded to employees by the Act would be indeed
illusory.
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir. 1939), modified on other
grounds, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
54198 N.L.R.B. 390 (1972).
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trucks, threatening and inflicting injury on non-striking employees,
threatening to run non-striking drivers off the road, throwing beer
cans on truck windshields and into truck cabs, sometimes hitting
the drivers, spraying beer on windshields, letting air out of tires,
cutting air hoses on trucks, putting pebbles in gas tanks, throwing
stones on the employer's premises, causing breakage to cases of
the employer's beer, and using "scab" and other four-letter words in
relation to working employees. 5 Nevertheless, the administrative
law judge, whose recommendation was adopted by the Board, refused to withhold a bargaining order and excused the union's misconduct as taking place in "the heat of picket line tensions." 56
Although a minimal amount of picket line violence and intimidation probably is an inevitable concomitant of labor disputes, the
picket line distinction should not be allowed to obscure the possibility that the union is cold-bloodedly using the "heat of picket line
tensions" shield to mount a calculated campaign of intimidation
and harassment.
C. Section 8(b)(1)(A) Settlement Agreements
In Laura Modes, the Board withheld its customary bargaining
order despite the fact that the union misconduct led to section
8(b)(1)(A) charges and a settlement agreement which the union
observed faithfully.5 In subsequent cases, however, the Board has
relied on the existence of a section 8(b)(1)(A) settlement agreement
58
as favoring the issuance of a bargaining order.
The Board's theory appears to be that a settlement agreement
is a sufficient remedy for the union's misbehavior, inasmuch as it
constitutes a "firm and enforceable commitment" that "future
union misconduct will not occur." 59 It is not at all clear, however,
why the union's promise under threat of prosecution to discontinue
its illegal conduct in the future should affect the judgment whether
it demonstrated a total disinterest in the Board's procedures in the
past.
55 Id. 403 & nn.28 & 30.
6 Id. 405.
57

Herbert Bernstein (Laura Modes Co.), 144 N.L.R.B. 1592, 1594 (1963).
See, e.g., Jimmy Dean Meat Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1040 (1977); Donelson
Packing Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1063 (1975), enforced mem., 569 F.2d 430 (6th
Cir. 1978); Cascade Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 533 (1971), enforcement denied on other
grounds per curiam, 466 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1972).
59 Cascade Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 533, 533 n.2 (1971), enforcement denied on
other grounds per curiam, 466 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1972).
58
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D. The Significance of Certification
The Board has never in any reported case withheld a bargaining order from a union duly certified as the employees' bargaining
representative. In a common scenario, the union petitions for a
representation election, obtains a majority vote in a valid election,
and wins certification by the Board. The employer refuses to recognize the union or bargain, and the union strikes. During the strike,
violence attributable to the union occurs. In the ensuing unfair
labor practice proceeding, the Board finds the employer guilty of a
section 8(a)(5) offense, and the employer objects to a bargaining
order remedy on the authority of Laura Modes. °
Both the equity and the representational rationale of Laura
Modes combine in this fact situation to create a very strong presumption against the employer's attempted defense. The employer
cannot effectively argue that the union's violence has thrown its
majority into doubt, because the Board enforces, with Supreme
Court approval, 61 a one year bar following certification against all
challenges to the certified union's majority status. 2 Neither can the
union's entitlement to a bargaining order be questioned under the
dominant branch of the Laura Modes rationale, which applies to
union misconduct evincing a total disinterest in utilizing the Board's
peaceful legal processes. Here the union has complied with the
Board's strict election conduct rules and emerged the victor in a
valid election contest.
This barrier, although great, is not insurmountable. In Union
Nacional de Trabajadores,3 a union that attempted to enforce its
recent election victory by extreme brutality saw its certification revoked by the Board within the certification year. There the union's
violence was held to terminate the employer's duty to bargain, and
the Board, citing Laura Modes, denied the union access to its remedial processes until it could demonstrate its majority status in a
second election.
60 See, e.g., Quintree Distribs., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 390 (1972); Cascade Corp.,
192 N.L.R.B. 533 (1971), enforcement denied on other grounds per curiam, 466

F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1972).
61
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
62
Exceptions to the certification year bar recognized by the Board include
dissolution or defunctness of the certified union, schism (in which the majority of
the employees in the bargaining unit transfer their affiliation to another union), and

radical fluctuations within a short time in the size of the bargaining unit. Brooks v.
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954).
63219 N.L.R.B. 862 (1975), enforced as modified, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
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Following the certification year, an employer can refuse to bargain or petition for an election if it can establish a good faith doubt
as to the union's majority." In this context, whether a union enjoys official certification by the Board or informal recognition by
the employer ordinarily makes no difference in the adjudication of
section 8(a)(5) charges and should not affect the analysis of a Laura
Modes defense.
IV.

APPELLATE RE IEW OF

Laura Modes CAsEs

Although none of the Laura Modes cases withholding bargaining orders have been subjected to appellate review,' 5 cases in which
the Board rejected the Laura Modes defense and issued a bargaining order have received a mixed reception in the courts of appeals.
In two early opinions, Judge Friendly foreshadowed the analysis
of Laura Modes contentions advanced in this Comment. In NLRB
v. United Mineral & Chemical Corp..6 Judge Friendly's opinion
for the court denied enforcement of the Board's bargaining order,
asserting several grounds for its decision. In that case, the Board
refused to adopt the administrative law judge's recommendation
that a bargaining order should not issue due to the gravity of the
union's violent misconduct. The court, reviewing the evidence,
first disagreed with the Board's understated account of the union's
misbehavior, finding it to be "part of a plan of intimidation." 67
Second, the court recognized that in reinstatement contexts involving strikers guilty of misconduct, the Board was required to balance
the seriousness of the employer's unfair labor practice against the
employee's misconduct, but questioned whether, if that test were
applicable in the case before it, the union's violence did not outweigh the less flagrant violations of the employer. Finally, Judge
Friendly doubted that a balancing test, however appropriate in the
reinstatement context in which the choice is between reinstating or
64 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
65 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted enforcement of the Board's
orders in NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977), a case involving closely related issues of union
violence. In that case, the Board found no § 8(a) (5) violation by the employer,
whose duty to bargain was terminated by the union's violent bargaining tactics,
and took the extraordinary step of revoking the union's certification. Thus, the
propriety of a bargaining order was not an issue on appeal. Although the court
found it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board's revocation of certification, it felt
obliged to express reservations concerning the Board's choice of remedy and noted
that the "normal remedial measure would be to refuse to enter a bargaining order
on behalf of the union." Id. 13.
66 391 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1968).
67 Id. 840.
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not reinstating the employee, was desirable in the bargaining order
situation, when a third and preferable alternative of conducting an
election is usually available: "It is exceedingly hard to believe that
Congress meant to authorize the Board to require bargaining with
a union having a bare card-count majority which has attempted to
increase this or to enforce its claim to representation by hitting
other employees or the employer on the head." 68 The court, however, left open the possibility that severe union violence might be
disregarded if unfair labor practices by the employer precluded the
holding of a fair election.6 9
In a later opinion denying enforcement of a bargaining order
on the grounds that the employer's violations were not so serious as
to render a fair election impossible, Judge Friendly went on to
observe that even if the employer's violations sufficed to justify a
bargaining order, the order would have to be withheld because the
union's misconduct intimidated the employees and eliminated the
chance of a fair election before the employer's violations ever took
70
place.
The skepticism about the Board's balancing test and the corresponding concern for the coercive effects of union violence on the
employees' free choice expressed in these two cases have been modified but not eliminated in subsequent cases decided by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Donovan v. NLRB, 71 another
case in which an administrative law judge refused to issue a bargaining order but was reversed by the Board, the court enforced the
Board's order, endorsed the Board's balancing test, and sounded a
note of extreme deference to the Board's "broad remedial authority." 72 Emphasizing the Board's expertise in remedial matters, the
court once again deferred to the Board's judgment in NLRB v.
Independent Association of Steel Fabricators, Inc.,73 but significantly chose not to enforce the Board's bargaining order and left
it to the Board's discretion to reconsider whether an election would
be a more appropriate sanction than an order to bargain. 74
Relying on the authority of Donovan, a divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's bar681d. 841.
69 Id.

70 NLRB v. World Carpets, Inc., 463 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1972).

71520 F.2d 1316 (2.d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
72 Id. 1323.
73582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978).
74 Id. 151-52.

UNION VIOLENCE AND BARGAINING

ORDERS

gaining order in NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center.7 5 The court
concurred in the Board's balancing of the equities approach and
concluded that denial of a bargaining order would be appropriate
only if the employer was less guilty of engendering a coercive
atmosphere than the union.76
Judge Hufstedler's carefully reasoned opinion, dissenting from
the majority's enforcement of the Board's remedy, deserves close
attention. She criticized the Board's approach to denying bargaining orders as "primarily a punitive measure designed to deter the
union from future misconduct" 77 and an inducement to the union
to rely on the Board's legal procedures instead of "resorting to violent self-help," 78 and focused on the role of the Laura Modes defense in vindicating employee rights. Because violence "can inject
an element of coercion and intimidation into the relationship between a union and its members which is incompatible with the
principle of employee free choice," 79 Judge Hufstedler asserted
that issuance of a bargaining order in favor of a union guilty of
serious misconduct runs counter to the basic policy of the Act.
Reexamining the Laura Modes case, Judge Hufstedler stressed
the representational strand in the Board's rationale and concluded
that "a prima facie showing of employee intimidation is made upon
proof that the union committed serious acts of violence." so Unless
the union demonstrates that the coercive effects of its misbehavior
have dissipated, it is no longer entitled to consideration as the
employees' freely chosen bargaining representative.
Focus on the effect of union violence on the statutory rights of
the employees led Judge Hufstedler to reject the Board's balancing
test. Unlike equitable considerations, which can be balanced, the
coercive effects of multiple employer and union violations are cumulative. The test for withholding a bargaining order, therefore,
should not involve a determination of whose misconduct was more
serious; rather it necessitates an inquiry whether the union's violence was sufficiently grave to introduce a coercive element into the
union's representational relationship with the employees. 8 '
75571 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1978).
76 Id.476.
77Id. 478 (Hufstedler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78 Id.

79 Id. 479.
80 Id.
81 Id.480. Judge Hufstedler would have remanded to the Board for specific
findings on the extent of the union misconduct and its effect on the employees and
suggested that an election could be held in lieu of a bargaining order if further
investigation by the Board proved too difficult or expensive. Id. 480 & n.2.
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V. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH TO Laura Modes
The preceding examination of cases decided by the Board and
the courts establishes that the equity rationale for the Laura Modes
defense reigns triumphant. The result is a stringent standard
which only the most egregious cases can overcome. Judge Hufstedler's piercing dissent in Triumph Curing Center, 2 however,
goes a long way towards rehabilitating the neglected representational
theory implicit in the Board's opinion in Laura Modes.
The cornerstone of the American system of labor collective
bargaining is the right of employees to choose their majority representatives freely. The legal machinery established by the Act and
administered by the Board exists in order to protect and enforce
those rights of representation. When a union bypasses the Board's
peaceful processes and resorts to violence and intimidation to enforce its claims upon the employer, the employees' representational
freedom is placed in double jeopardy. In the primary sense, union
violence coerces and restrains employees in the exercise of their
rights under the Act. Derivatively, union misconduct threatens the
whole structure of the administrative process that gives meaning
and content to those rights. The prevailing approach to the Laura
Modes doctrine, which emphasizes respect for the Board's procedures, serves only to protect employee rights in the derivative sense
and ignores the fundamental and much more obvious threat to the
free choice of the frightened employee.
The truthfulness of the union's claims does not mitigate the
coercive effect of union misconduct on the employee. Fear and
intimidation leave him no room for thoughtful evaluation of the
employer's and the union's respective positions. Moreover, the
Board recognizes that the employer's unfair labor practices do not
cancel out the union's misconduct, but rather compound and aggravate its intimidating effect.8 3 Judge Hufstedler correctly observed that from the perspective of the rights of the employees
balancing is beside the point.8 The equities of the employer's and
the union's violations can only be weighed after employee rights
are removed from the scales. But to exclude the employees from
this calculus is to lose sight of the purpose of the bargaining order
82 571 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1978).
8
3Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, Div. of Grede Foundries, Inc., 235
N.L.R.B. No. 40, slip op. at 8 (Mar. 24, 1978), [1978] NLRB Dec. 31,776, 31,779;
Donelson Packing Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1060 (1975), enforced mem., 569 F.2d
430 (6th Cir. 1978).
84NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462, 480 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Hufstedler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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remedy, which is designed not to reward or punish the union, but
primarily to give effect to the right of the employees to bargain
collectively through the representative of their choice.
In any case in which union violence is raised as an objection to
a bargaining order remedy, the first inquiry must be the extent to
which the union's misconduct coerced or restrained employees in
the exercise of their rights under the Act. If the coercion is serious
enough under the circumstances to create doubt about the employees' continued support of the union as their bargaining representative, then a bargaining order should not issue.
A. Reexamining the Board's Criteria
From this new perspective the Board's traditional criteriathe scope and intent of the union's misconduct,"' the location of the
misconduct on or away from the picket line, 86 the existence of a
section 8(b)(1)(A) settlement agreement, 87 and the significance of
certification 8 8-must all submit to reexamination.
That union violence is pervasive and deliberate will remain
significant under the new test, not because those characteristics
demonstrate a "total disinterest" in enforcing rights through the
Board's peaceful legal processes, but rather because violence that
is either pervasive, deliberate, or both, will undoubtedly operate
to coerce and intimidate the employees. Focusing on the employees in this way will eliminate the necessity under the Board's existing approach to delve into the subjective intent of the union in
order to determine whether the union's acts rise to the level of a
plan or policy of intimidation. Under the new approach, collateral
evidence that the union did in fact pursue its rights through the
Board's established procedures will no longer let the union off the
hook, unless those lawful efforts can be shown to have mollified the
coercive effects of the union s violence on the employees. Most
importantly, the new emphasis on the free choice of the employees
significantly lowers the barrier to making out a successful Laura
Modes defense; plainly, union misconduct need not approach "pervasive, planned violence" s9 to coerce employees significantly and
to render suspect the union's representative status.
85

8

See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.

6 See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
87
See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
88
See text accompanying notes 60-64 supra.
89 Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 264, 288 (1977),
enforced in part, 582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978).
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The picket line distinction retains meaning under the new
approach to Laura Modes only insofar as employees survive the
minor scuffles and name calling of the picket line without being
coerced or intimidated to any significant extent. It makes little
sense, however, to consider an assault at the picket line to be less
intimidating than one of exactly the same nature occurring thirty
feet away inside the walls of the plant. The Board's mechanical
use of the picket line distinction to excuse serious union violence
in wholesale fashion cannot be countenanced once attention focuses
on the representational rights of employees.
The existence of a section 8 (b)(1)(A) settlement agreement
provides institutional assurances that the union will refrain from
further poisoning the atmosphere, but it is doubtful that it helps
very much to erase coercive effects already created by union misconduct or to reassure the individual employee that he may act
freely without fear of union reprisals in the future. Although somewhat relevant to the Board's current approach, with its concern that
the union demonstrate respect for the Board's procedures, a settlement agreement should not count in a union's favor under the new
test because it is largely irrelevant as a remedy for preexisting employee intimidation.
If the union is certified and its misconduct occurs within the
certification year, the new approach to withholding bargaining
orders runs counter to the Board's policy against questioning the
union's majority status during the certification year. The certification year bar, however, should not be conceived as a union license
to terrorize employees. 90 If the union's misconduct reaches the
extremes portrayed in Union Nacional de Trabaiadores,91 the Board
will revoke the union's certification. A less extreme remedy, for
less extreme misconduct, would be to treat egregious union violence
as yet another exception to the certification year bar, and to deny
bargaining orders to guilty unions even though they have recently
been certified pursuant to an election conducted by the Board.
Such a remedy would accord fully with the policy of stability in
collective bargaining relationships that underlies the bar, 92 because
a union that resorts to serious violence to enforce its aims is an
90

See NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 13 n.11 (1st
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
91 Union Nacional de Trabaiadores, 219 N.L.R.B. 862 (1975), enforced as
modified, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
92 See R. GonmtAN, supra note 13, at 52.
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unlikely candidate for establishing a stable and harmonious rela93
tionship with the employer.
Once the certification year has passed, no special sanctity attaches to a union's certification so that informally recognized and
officially certified unions deserve equal treatment under the new
test.
B. Measuring the Coercive Effects of Union Misconduct
By what standard should the Board measure the coercive effects
of union misconduct? In the Gissel initial recognition context, a
bargaining order is appropriate if the employer's unfair labor practices have rendered a fair election unlikely and the union has
demonstrated a prior card majority.94 Under Gissel, the issuance
of a bargaining order represents a judgment that, even though authorization cards are a less reliable means of acertaining employee
free choice than an election, they are sufficiently indicative of the
employees' desires to support a bargaining order if the alternative
of an election has been foreclosed due to the employer's violations.
When the Laura Modes question arises in this context, the appropriateness of a Gissel bargaining order has already been decided,
and the only issue is whether that remedy should be withheld because of the union's misconduct. The standard here ought, therefore, to be whether the union's misconduct has so coerced or intimidated the employees that the union's prior card majority has
become too unreliable an indicator of the employees' free choice to
support the weighty sanction of a bargaining order.
Such a standard is obviously a less stringent one than would
be supplied by simply transposing the Gissel test and deciding
whether the union's conduct, standing alone, renders a fair election
improbable. Because cards are inherently untrustworthy indicators
of employee support for the union, a small amount of union coercion will go a long way to erode confidence in their continuing reliability.
When the employer's refusal to bargain and the certified union's
misconduct occur during the certification year, the Board should
create another exception to the certification year bar for egregious
union misconduct. For union violence that is less than egregious
but still serious, the Board should apply a standard more tolerant of
union violence because a recently certified union is entitled to a
presumption of majority support.
93

See Herbert Bernstein (Laura Modes Co.), 144 N.L.R.B. 1592, 1595 (1963).
94NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969). See note 15 supra.
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If an employer raises the Laura Modes defense to defeat a bargaining order in favor of an incumbent union, the standard the
Board should apply depends on the resolution of a preliminary
issue. The Board and the majority of the circuit courts currently
afford a stronger presumption of majority support to an incumbent
union than to a card majority union seeking initial recognition, 5
despite the contrary implications of Gissel and Linden Lumber. If
this view were applied in the Laura Modes context, a stronger showing of union coercion would be required to justify denial of a bargaining order when the union had enjoyed a bargaining relationship
in the past, than when a card majority union sought initial recognition. Even if the majority view is accepted in ordinary
cases in which no union misconduct issue arises, that view is illsuited to the Laura Modes situation. The prevailing view justifies
the stronger presumption for incumbent unions by appealing to the
value of stability of established collective bargaining relationships. 6
But union violence, because it is inherently destructive of stable
labor relations, negates that rationale and leaves only the
value of protecting the employees' free choice to be considered.
Thus, in the context of an incumbent union as well as in the context of initial recognition, the Board should apply the same stand97
ard in measuring the coercive effects of union violence.
C. Rebutting the Inference of Coercion
Under the new approach to Laura Modes defenses proposed
here, the union will have the opportunity to show that the coercive
effects of its misconduct have been dissipated. For example, if
those responsible for the violence are disciplined, or thrown out of
office, or if other evidence of free and uncoerced support of the
union is established, the union may be able to rebut the inferences
that would otherwise be drawn from its misconduct. It may also
be possible for the union to show that its misbehavior did not intimidate the employees in the first place. Such a showing can be
imagined in a situation involving a small bargaining unit, where
95 See R. GoamAN, supra note 13, at 114-16.
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See NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.6 (3d Cir. 1970).

On this point, Judge Hufstedler is in agreement: "The potential for employee
intimidation from union directed violence is every bit as great whether, as here,
the union's representative status had been determined before the violence occurred
or whether . . . the violence was a concomitant of a representation struggle."
NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462, 479 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J.,
97

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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all the employees willingly participate in violent acts directed exclusively at the employer.
In either of these cases when protection of the employees' free
choice does not require denial of a bargaining order, a bargaining
order should still be withheld if the equities balance in favor of the
employer. Proper emphasis on the safeguarding of employee rights
does not entirely displace the Board's current approach or its emphasis on the peaceful, legal resolution of labor disputes through
established procedures, but merely consigns it to a secondary or
back-up position.
D. Justifying the Election Remedy
The solution of withholding a bargaining order and requiring
the union to demonstrate its majority support in an election may
strike some observers as paradoxical. The employer's violations,
after all, have rendered a fair election unlikely, and the additional
misconduct of the union has only made matters worse. To hold an
election under these circumstances seems rather like cutting off
one's nose to spite one's face.
The paradox disappears, however, if the election is not held
until a time when the coercive effects of both the employer's and the
union's misconduct have worn off, and a free and fair election becomes possible. 98 In the interim, collective bargaining between
the parties falls into a state of suspended animation. This state of
affairs concededly deprives the employees of their representational
rights, but the quandary is one brought about by the employees'
selected representative. Moreover, the employees' loss is merely
temporary and enforces a policy that in the long run protects employee rights. The alternative of disregarding the union's violence
and issuing a bargaining order would doubly disserve the employees'
interests, first by saddling them with a representative of dubious
majority status, and second, by destroying a strong disincentive to
union-sponsored intimidation of employees. On balance, the remedy of a delayed election best accords with the policy of guaranteeing to employees their free choice of bargaining representative.
98

See Allou Distribs., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 47, 48 (1973); Joseph H. Bliss
(Artcraft Mantel & Fireplace Co.), 174 N.L.R.B. 737, 744 (1969); Herbert
Cf. Union
Bernstein (Laura Modes Co.); 144 N.L.R.B. 1592, 1596 (1963).
Nacional de Trabajadores, 219 N.L.R.B. 862, 864 (1975) (certification revoked until
union can demonstrate majority in election untainted by coercive atmosphere)
enforced as modified, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Sixteen years ago in Laura Modes Co.,99 the National Labor
Relations Board inaugurated a policy of withholding its customary
bargaining order remedy for employer refusals to bargain when the
union seeking relief has engaged in serious acts of violence. Although not lacking in opportunities, the Board has seen fit to withhold bargaining orders in only two cases since Laura Modes, under
a balancing test that requires union misconduct to evince a "total
disinterest" in legal procedures, discounts picket line violence and
counts the existence of a section 8(b)(1)(A) settlement agreement
and certification status in the union's favor.
The Board's balancing approach to Laura Modes defenses has
received mixed reviews in the courts of appeals and has been subjected to penetrating criticism for its lack of concern with the coercive effects of union violence on the fundamental right of employees
to choose their collective bargaining representative freely.
This Comment has proposed a new approach to withholding
bargaining orders because of violent union misconduct. Instead of
weighing the employer's violations against the union's to determine
which are more serious, the Board should focus on the coercive
effects of union misconduct on the free choice of employees. If the
coercion is serious enough to cast doubt on the employees' continued support of the union, then a bargaining order should not
issue and the employer should be relieved of its duty to bargain
with the union until the latter demonstrates its majority status in a
Board-conducted election. This new approach significantly lowers
the threshold of union misconduct necessary to make out a successful Laura Modes defense. The location of union misconduct on the
picket line or the existence of a section 8(b)(1)(A) settlement agreement are relevant to this inquiry only to the extent that they bear
on the coercive effects of the union's violence on the employees.
In initial recognition contexts, the Board's standard should be
whether the union's misconduct has rendered the union's card majority too suspect to sustain the burden of a bargaining order. If
the union is certified and the dispute occurs during the certification
year, the Board should create another exception to the certification
year bar for cases involving egregious union misconduct; otherwise,
a recently certified union is entitled to a presumption of employee
support. For certified unions beyond the certification year and informally recognized unions, the Board should apply the same standard as in the initial recognition context.
99

Herbert Bernstein (Laura Modes Co.), 144 N.L.R.B. 1592 (1963).
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To rebut the inference of loss of majority support the union
may present evidence showing that the coercive effects of its misconduct have been dissipated or never existed in the first place. If
the union successfully negotiates this hurdle, it must still prevail
under the Board's balancing test, which now constitutes the second
step in the scrutiny of union misconduct.
The proposed approach to denying bargaining orders envisions that an election will not be held until the coercive atmosphere has cleared, making possible a fair test of employee sentiment.
This remedy, in contrast to a bargaining order, prevents the imposition of an unwanted union on the employees, while at the same
time creating a strong disincentive to union violence. A revival of
the LauraModes doctrine along these lines will nurture the national
labor policy ideal of collective bargaining that is both democratic
and peaceful.

